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Presidential fingerprints inevitably can be found on almost any highly
consequential action undertaken by an executive branch agency. This also can
be true when agencies refrain from taking action. For example, when the
Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
announced in 2011 that she would withdraw a proposal to tighten federal smog
standards, her announcement came only after a White House official and the
President sent her memos making it abundantly clear that the President
wanted her to take that step.1 When the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Treasury Department announced, during the period from
2012 to 2014, a series of delays in the enforcement of various requirements of
the Affordable Care Act, the President and his staff were deeply involved in
crafting these workaround measures that made it easier to implement a
complicated statute.2 And when the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) sent a memo to the heads of the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and two other DHS agencies in late 2014, telling them
to refrain from deporting millions of undocumented immigrants who met
certain criteria, the President himself made a televised address to the nation
announcing these sweeping immigration deferrals as if the actions being
taken were solely his own.3
1 See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement by EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson
on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa
/admpress.nsf/1e5ab1124055f3b28525781f0042ed40/e41fbc47e7ff4f13852578ff00552bf8 [https://perma
.cc/2SW9-NL2Z] (announcing that the EPA would “revisit” its draft revisions to the national ozone
standards); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President
on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards
[https://perma.cc/27JH-TWWY] (requesting that the EPA Administrator withdraw draft final revisions to
the national ozone standards); Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK4E-3FLM]
(memorializing reasons that supported President Obama’s request that the EPA reconsider its draft
revisions to national ozone standards).
2 For an account of the Obama Administration’s delays in the implementation of the health care
reform law popularly known as “Obamacare,” see Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation
of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1721-25 (2016).
3 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FTC9-CS6N]; see also President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration
[https:// perma.cc/X3JM-PYCM] (announcing “actions I’m taking” to provide deferrals of deportation to
certain undocumented immigrants). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement
Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2016) (using President Obama’s deferred action immigration program
to “explor[e] the President’s obligation of faithful execution”).
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In each of these cases, as in many others across different administrations,
White House intervention played an important, if not arguably decisive, role
in the resulting outcomes.4 Yet the underlying legislation in most of these cases
specifically delegated implementing authority to the head of each agency, not
to the President. In such cases, may the President lawfully become the decisive
factor in determining what actions an administrator takes or does not take?
From the nation’s earliest days, Presidents have tended to assume that, as
the head of the executive branch and as the official who can remove the heads
of most agencies at will, Presidents do have the authority to direct what
executive branch agencies do.5 But the nature and extent of the President’s
directive authority has also been vigorously debated by legal scholars,6
especially recently during the George W. Bush Administration, with its
emphasis on the unitary executive theory, and through the duration of what
President Obama’s political opponents have called his “imperial” presidency.7
The continuing debate over the President’s directive authority is but one of
the many separation-of-powers issues that have confronted courts, scholars,
government officials, and the public in recent years. The Supreme Court, for
instance, has considered whether the President possesses the power to make
appointments of agency heads without Senate confirmation during certain
congressional recesses.8 The Court has passed judgment recently, but has yet to
resolve fully, questions about Congress’s authority to constrain the President’s
power to remove the heads of administrative agencies.9 And the Court has
considered the limits on Congress’s ability to delegate legislative authority to other

4 When those outcomes seem to result in a systemic retreat from the enforcement of statutory
rules, the question arises whether Presidents have failed to fulfill their constitutional obligation to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Neither the Take Care
Clause itself nor the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it makes any answer clear. See Jack
Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1864 (2016)
(“[I]dentifying the line between a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion and an
impermissible dispensation of the law seems very much like a matter of degree, the limits of which
are subjective and difficult to define in a principled way.”).
5 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4, 420-27 (2008) (concluding that “almost
all of our presidents . . . have exercised the power to direct and control the actions of subordinates”).
6 See infra Part I.
7 Ashley Parker, ‘Imperial Presidency’ Becomes a Rallying Cry for Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us/politics/imperial-presidency-becomes-republicans-rallying-slogan
.html [https://perma.cc/FN73-DJCZ].
8 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57 (2014) (finding that the President’s recess
appointments, made in a three-day period between two pro forma sessions of the Senate, were invalid).
9 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010) (“While
we have sustained in certain cases limits on the President’s removal power, the Act before us imposes
a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise
significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”).
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rulemaking institutions.10 In these and other cases involving disputes over
interbranch relations, courts and academic analysts have perennially grappled with
both legal interpretation as well as constitutional history and political theory. Yet,
as much as these cases involve law, history, and theory, they also at least implicitly
raise decidedly empirical questions about law’s effects on governmental behavior as
well as its impacts on the legitimacy of constitutional government.
Empirical questions are embedded throughout all forms of law, but the
empirical effects of structural aspects of constitutional law have so far largely
escaped systematic study.11 Admittedly, political scientists have studied the
three branches of government and their interactions extensively, but what
have so far avoided systematic empirical study are the relationships between
different choices about separation-of-powers doctrine and outcomes in terms
of governmental behavior or public attitudes about governmental legitimacy.12
This Article offers an initial foray into this largely unexplored terrain,
providing a distinctive empirical investigation of public norms about
executive power and how doctrinal choices can affect perceptions of the
legitimacy of legal judgments. We focus here on Presidents’ efforts to get
involved in shaping what agencies do.
Part I begins with a brief overview of the main legal issue motivating this
Article: legal limits on a President’s role in shaping action or inaction by
executive branch officials appointed to lead administrative agencies. We
10 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231-33 (2015) (assessing whether
Congress improperly delegated authority to issue standards for certain railroad services and holding
that Amtrak was a governmental entity rather than an autonomous private entity).
11 Of course, in recent decades, an important and growing body of empirical research on
administrative law has arisen; however, most of this work has focused on administrative procedures
rather than on structural issues of separation of powers. See generally Cary Coglianese, Empirical
Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111 (discussing major empirical findings with
respect to various administrative procedures). More generally, research on procedural justice has
informed researchers and process designers alike of the ways that choices about procedures can affect
public judgments about the legitimacy of governmental institutions. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND &
TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
12 Some social science research has examined Presidents’ power in issuing executive orders.
See, e.g., KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 10 (2002) (arguing that executive orders are a “potent source of presidential
power” and providing examples of agencies that had their origins in executive orders, which
ultimately increased presidential “administrative capacity”). Other work has even investigated
patterns of judicial review of executive orders. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT
PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 136-74 (2003) (offering an
empirical analysis of every litigated challenge to an executive order heard in court between 1942 and
1998). One study has suggested that doctrinal differences between presidential authority in foreign
and military affairs versus domestic affairs help explain patterns of judicial outcomes in cases
involving executive orders. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and
Presidential Power During the Postwar Era, 51 J. POL. 98, 112-15 (1989). Yet none of the existing work
examines what interests us here—namely, how the doctrinal form of separation-of-powers law may
affect perceptions of the legitimacy of law and legal institutions.

2016]

Separation of Powers Legitimacy

1873

explain how norms constraining presidential involvement in administration
can be conceived in the form of either standards or rules. We suggest that a
leading conception of an applicable standard in this context—a standard that
distinguishes between presidential oversight and decisionmaking—is unlikely to
do much, if anything, to constrain Presidents from effectively controlling
administrative agencies. We hypothesize further that the invocation of such a
standard could actually undermine law’s legitimacy, a concern especially worthy
of exploration given that the standard purportedly applies to a high-level,
political setting where judgments about compliance with it will almost
inevitably become politicized. A norm in the form of a rule will, we predict,
turn out to be more resistant to illegitimacy concerns.
Part II details the four empirical studies we conducted to examine the
expectations introduced in Part I. We begin by describing our research
methods, which comprise vignette-based surveys, and then proceed to report
our results. Taken together, the surveys provide a revealing window into public
perceptions about responsibility for governmental action, disagreements between
Presidents and the heads of agencies, and how the form of separation-of-powers
norms can shape perceptions of legitimacy. We find, among other things, that
people’s judgments about the legitimacy of constitutional law rulings can be
affected by the form that legal doctrine takes, even when controlling for any
perceived substantive differences in the law. Specifically, our evidence indicates
that public views about the legitimacy of court decisions can be negatively
affected by standard-like formulations of separation-of-powers doctrine relative
to a formulation based upon a bright-line rule.
Part III concludes by highlighting the implications of our findings. Most
broadly, our empirical results imply that what appears to be the prevailing
view about the applicable doctrinal standard on executive power would
benefit from reconsideration. Our results raise questions as to how much
positive value, if any, comes from a standard based on a distinction between
oversight and decisionmaking. Not only is the standard extremely difficult—if
not impossible—to operationalize in any clear manner, but also our results
suggest that, irrespective of such a standard, Presidents do face other
meaningful constraints, due to, if nothing else, the responsibility the public
assigns to Presidents when they start to get involved in administrative matters.
Perhaps more striking than the prevailing oversight-versus-decisionmaking
standard’s limited, if nonexistent, positive value, our results indicate that such
a standard in this context brings with it certain negative effects, in terms of a
loss to law’s legitimacy. Public attitudes about legal legitimacy are negatively
affected by the invocation of standard-like norms on executive power, while by
comparison such legitimacy remains more resilient when rule-like norms prevail.
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I. EXECUTIVE POWER NORMS AND LAW’S LEGITIMACY
This Article brings new empirical inquiry to an old debate over the role
of Presidents in directing the daily functioning of government by
administrative agencies. The impact of federal administrative agencies is hard
to overstate. They administer public subsidies, enforce civil rights laws,
regulate everything from food safety to nuclear power plant operation, and
perform every domestic function of federal government that affects the lives
of Americans. Congress may adopt about one hundred statutes per year, but
the more than one hundred administrative agencies, like the Department of
Transportation and the EPA, collectively adopt several thousand new
regulations every year.13 Officials at these myriad federal agencies routinely
exercise discretion in ways that result in enormous consequential effects on
individual and societal welfare—for good or ill.14
If much of government today is administrative government, who bears the
responsibility and authority for directing administration? One answer
emphasizes the heads of administrative agencies, whether they are cabinet
secretaries, commissioners, or administrators. By their express terms, most
statutes delegate administrative authority specifically to these heads of
administrative agencies. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
delegates authority to the Secretary of Labor: “The Secretary may by rule
promulgate, modify, or revoke any occupational safety or health standard . . . .”15
The Clean Air Act similarly delegates authority to issue automobile emissions
standards to the Administrator of the EPA:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in
accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission
of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.16

If an automobile manufacturer fails to comply with the vehicle emissions
standards adopted by the EPA, the Clean Air Act further states that “[t]he
Administrator may commence a civil action to assess and recover any civil
penalty” provided for under the statute.17 Much the same can be said for most
other federal agencies and their underlying statutes.
13 PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 109 (11th ed. 2011).
14 Administrators can produce these significant consequences through both their action and inaction.
Throughout this Article, we mean “action” to encompass both action and inaction. Cf. Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (defining “agency action” to include “failure to act”).
15 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
16 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
17 Id. § 7524(b) (emphasis added).
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Yet congressional delegations of authority to agencies are also made
against the backdrop of a constitutional system of separated powers, with
Article II of the Constitution stating that “[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”18 That same Article
gives Presidents the authority to appoint the heads of administrative agencies,
with senatorial advice and consent.19 Presidents also have the power to
remove the heads of administrative agencies on an “at will” basis, at least
absent any legislative restriction to the contrary.20
Throughout U.S. history, Presidents have assumed the authority to lead
the administrative parts of government, as an integral exercise of executive
authority. Supporters of a “unitary executive” theory argue that by vesting
executive authority in one President, the Constitution authorizes the
President to coordinate and ultimately direct the actions taken by the
appointees that head up administrative agencies.21 In recent years, Presidents
of both political parties have publicly proclaimed their authority to direct the
administration of the federal government. President George W. Bush
famously declared, “I’m the decider,”22 while President Barack Obama
asserted, “I’ve got a pen to take executive actions where Congress won’t.”23
Scholars have sharply debated the nature and extent of such claims of
presidential authority to direct administrative agencies. One side of this
debate treats the President’s directive authority as virtually unconstrained,
whether as a matter of constitutional law (the unitary executive theory) or as
a matter of statutory presumption. As a law professor, for example, Justice
Elena Kagan articulated the statutory form of this view when she argued for
“broad control” by the President over the actions of administrative agencies,
concluding that Presidents presumptively possess the power to impose legally
binding orders for administrative action, absent some clear statutory
prohibition to the contrary.24
The other side of the debate holds that, even absent a specific statutory
prohibition, presidential authority over administrators is constrained in that the
President cannot make decisions that have been entrusted by Congress to

18
19
20
21
22

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
E.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 4.
Ed Henry & Barbara Starr, Bush: ‘I’m the Decider’ on Rumsfeld, CNN (Apr. 18, 2006, 10:30 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ [https://perma.cc/UX6J-7J5G].
23 Tamara Keith, Wielding a Pen and a Phone, Obama Goes It Alone, NPR (Jan. 20, 2014, 3:36 AM)
(internal quotation mark omitted), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263766043/wielding-a-pen-and-a-phone
-obama-goes-it-alone [https://perma.cc/2825-HZEW].
24 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2236, 2251-52 (2001).
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administrators.25 Although Presidents are in this respect constrained, they are not
so constrained as to be walled off from administrative agencies altogether. This
second side of the debate recognizes that Presidents can oversee the work of
administrative agencies; after all, Article II authorizes Presidents to “require”
opinions from agency heads, and it imposes an obligation on the President to “take
Care” that laws are “faithfully executed.”26 But under this view, Presidents are
allowed only to oversee agency actions; they cannot make decisions for them.27
This second view results in a standard-like executive power norm because
the line between permissible presidential oversight and impermissible
decisionmaking is far from clear. As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, the
distinction between the President as overseer and the President as decider is
“subtle.”28 Nevertheless, proponents of a standard based on this distinction
argue that, despite the inherent difficulty in line-drawing, such a standard
offers an important source of executive constraint.29
The doctrinal debate over presidential administrative authority can be
cast, at least in part, as a debate between rules versus standards.30 Against a
unitary executive rule treating the President as supreme over the rest of the
executive branch, at least absent an express statutory prohibition, advocates
of a constrained presidency put forward a standard based on the spongy concept
of a “decision.” Yet there exists still another alternative to a standard based on
a subtle distinction between oversight and decisionmaking: adherence to a
bright-line rule holding that, for policies or actions to take legal effect,

25 See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 159 (2009) (“[T]he elected President still exerts powerful influence over each
agency, but final decision making authority on matters that the Constitution allows Congress to regulate would
rest in those agencies to which our elected Congress delegates decision making authority.”); Robert V. Percival,
Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001)
(“[A]lthough the president’s ability to remove agency heads gives him enormous power to influence their
decisions, it does not give him the authority to dictate substantive decisions entrusted to them by law.”); Peter
L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
696, 704-05 (2007) (“[I]n ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a
named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role—like that of
the Congress and the courts—is that of overseer and not decider.”).
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3.
27 SHANE, supra note 25; Strauss, supra note 25; see also, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge?
Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2487, 2490 (2011) (arguing that despite the influence that the President may exert over agency heads
as a result of the executive removal power, the President cannot “dictate the substance of agency
decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads”).
28 Strauss, supra note 25, at 704.
29 SHANE, supra note 25, at 145 (“[T]he difference between the President as overseer and the
President as decider can shape many a key decision.”).
30 For a discussion of rules and standards in administrative law, see generally Colin S. Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
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applicable documents must be signed by the duly-authorized agency head.31
This alternative accepts that, when a statute expressly grants authority to the
head of an agency, only that agency head can officially authorize agency action;
however, this alternative is operationalized as a clear rule based on who signs the
legally relevant documents announcing policies or authorizing agency actions.
As should be apparent, such a formal, bright-line signature rule can be
accommodated within the fuzzy contours of an overseer–decider standard, for
if a President were to sign a policy or approval document instead of the agency
head, the signing itself would constitute evidence that the President had
impermissibly crossed the line and made the decision for the agency. The key
difference between a rule-based approach and an overseer–decider standard lies
in the standard’s underlying assumption that something more than just a
President’s signature could demonstrate that a President has gone too far. The
bright-line rule approach makes the constraint on presidential involvement
clear but limited, as any presidential action short of signing the applicable
document would be permitted; the overseer–decider standard, by contrast,
places additional, albeit murky, constraints on presidential involvement.
As a practical if not legal matter, determining whether the Constitution
imposes a rule or a standard on executive power in this context seems to have
no chance of resolution by the courts.32 For one, the chances of someone taking
a claim to court, and then having the court deciding to pass judgment on the
matter, are virtually nil.33 Presidents and their administrators will certainly not
be suing themselves; standing will be a barrier for others; and the courts will
continue to be very reluctant to entertain political questions, especially those
pertaining to the internal management of the executive branch.34
But there is another important reason the debate between bright-line rules and
subtle standards in this context will not be resolved by the courts: any purported
standard based on an overseer–decider distinction can be easily interpreted and
applied in such a way as to be as non-constraining as a bright-line signature rule.
In another article, one of us has shown how easy it is for Presidents to work
around an overseer–decider standard and achieve their policy objectives in a
31 For a discussion of this type of executive power norm and its strength in allowing agency heads to
resist pressure from White House officials, see Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving
Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
32 As Sid Shapiro and Richard Murphy have noted, “Remarkably, after more than two centuries, we
are still not sure if the President . . . plays the role of ‘overseer’ or ‘decider’ in our administrative state.”
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling
Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 7-8 (2009).
33 An empirical study of litigation filed by private parties against government agencies reveals the
virtual absence of judicial constraint. Only about 1% of all executive orders issued during the final six
decades of the last century were subjected to any judicial challenge, and even in those few adjudicated
cases, the President’s authority was affirmed 83% of the time. HOWELL, supra note 12, at 154 & fig.6.2.
34 Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 12-13) (on file with authors).
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manner that still complies with the standard.35 Presidents can and do make
decisions and impose them on their administrators; however, especially under
conditions of secrecy, they can also easily adopt several techniques to
circumvent the supposed legal limitation on their making of decisions. For
example, Presidents can engage in “we-speak,” proclaiming that decisions
have been made by “the [A]dministration.”36 They can also make “requests”
rather than impose directives, even though it is known that such requests are
not really asking for favors.37 Absent any meaningful prospect of judicial
enforcement, and with easy ways of evading the subtle overseer–decider
standard, the benefits that this standard could potentially deliver in terms of
protecting administrative agencies from presidential overreach would appear
to be trivial or merely symbolic, if not altogether nonexistent.
If the overseer–decider standard yields no real benefits, we might ask whether
there is nevertheless anything wrong with clinging to it. After all, a standard that
lacks benefits may also lack any costs. Yet with the overseer–decider standard,
there is a distinct possibility that it is not as innocuous as it might seem. It may
actually present some costs in terms of weakening law’s legitimacy. If the
standard is so subtle that determining whether a President has crossed the
line between oversight and decisionmaking rests in the eyes of the beholder,
then presidential involvement in the administrative state will remain
continuously susceptible to criticism for being unconstitutional, especially in
times of divided government. In such an inherently political climate,
practically any consequential attempt a President makes to shape the work of
administrative agencies will be prone to criticism by politicians of the
opposite party. When these criticisms are couched in terms of assertions “that
the Constitution imposes an overseer-decider limit,” the risk arises of
“undermining administrative law by unnecessarily politicizing it and thereby
diminishing the respect for it needed to help to sustain its behavioral force.”38

35
36
37

Id. (manuscript at 17-22).
Id. (manuscript at 18).
See id. (manuscript at 19) (“It is quite easy for a President to make clear what he expects his political
appointees to do when it comes to domestic policy matters such as rulemaking, without explicitly commanding
those appointees to adopt a rule. He can simply ‘request’ that they do so.” (footnote omitted)).
38 Id. (manuscript at 5). For a general explication of the relationship between legal legitimacy
and compliance, see generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). Political
scientists have shown empirically that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court declines in the face of
“politicization”—i.e., when people “substitute a political frame for a legal frame”—such as during
politically contentious confirmation battles. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA,
CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS 12 n.11 (2009).
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Consider the following example of how a standard could lead to such
unnecessary politicization.39 Under the Clean Air Act, automobile emissions
standards are normally set by the federal EPA.40 But Section 209 of the Act
gives the EPA Administrator the authority—indeed, the duty—to grant a
waiver to the state of California to create its own vehicle emissions standards
under specified conditions.41 As with other delegations, the statute specifically
names the Administrator, not the President: “[t]he Administrator shall . . . waive
application of this section,” “[n]o such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator
finds,” and so forth.42 During the George W. Bush Administration, the EPA
announced a denial of an application California had filed to be allowed to adopt
greenhouse gas emissions standards for automobiles—something the federal
government had yet to impose at that time.43 The circumstances under which
the EPA announced its denial—namely, shortly after a meeting the EPA
Administrator attended at the White House—gave rise to charges that
President Bush had overstepped the overseer–decider line.44 In a congressional
hearing following the EPA’s announcement, then-Representative Henry
Waxman, a Democrat, rebuked then-Administrator Stephen Johnson, stating
that “[t]he law does not provide that it is the president’s decision.”45 And yet
barely a year later, within one week of assuming office, President Obama issued
a formal memo to the EPA directing the new Administrator to reconsider the
agency’s denial of California’s waiver request.46 In a speech that accompanied the
release of his memorandum, President Obama made it clear that the days when
“Washington stood in [the] way” should come to an end.47 And Mr. Waxman’s
response was nothing but laudatory praise. “President Obama is taking the nation
in a decisive new direction that will receive broad support across the country,”
Waxman approvingly declared.48
39 For a further discussion of the episode described in the following example, see Cary Coglianese,
Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
637, 642-45 (2010).
40 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
41 Id. § 7543(b).
42 Id.
43 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Governor, Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LA8A-RK8Z].
44 EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform H.R.,
110th Cong. 146 (2008).
45 Id.
46 Memorandum for the Administrator of the EPA on State of California Request for Waiver
Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905, 4905 (Jan. 26, 2009).
47 Remarks on Energy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 14, 16 (Jan. 26, 2009).
48 See President Obama Has Set Energy Policies on a Path Led by Science and Innovation, DEMOCRATIC
LEADER NANCY PELOSI (Jan. 26, 2009) , http://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/president-obama-has
-set-energy-policies-on-a-path-led-by-science-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/UV83-SM95].
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Democrats like Henry Waxman are not the only ones who flip-flop.49
Examples abound on both sides of the aisle. Politicians on the political right
tend to view Democratic Presidents’ influence as impermissible (i.e., deciding),
while seeing the same influence by Republican Presidents as permissible (i.e.,
oversight). House Republicans who were silent about President George W.
Bush’s assertions of presidential directive authority, for example, have sharply
criticized executive actions taken by President Obama.50 They have even
authorized the filing of litigation against the Administration over certain of its
executive actions taken under the Affordable Care Act.51
The very predictability of partisan posturing raises pivotal questions relevant
to the choice between rules and standards over executive power. What happens to
law’s legitimacy when it enters into a polarized political contestation? When Henry
Waxman criticizes President Bush for action contrary to “the law,” does this risk
contaminating the law with partisanship and undermining its legitimacy? Might
the very subtlety of the overseer–decider distinction actually encourage politicians
to exploit it as a political tool and conceal partisan arguments as legal ones?
If such outcomes can be expected, then what might appear to be a plausibly
attractive, even if unenforceable, doctrinal standard could ultimately prove harmful.
The overseer–decider standard might not only fail to deliver benefits in terms of
reducing presidential influence over administrative decisions; it might also generate
tangible costs in terms of diminishing the legitimacy of law. The very sponginess
of the overseer–decider standard, when applied in such a politically charged
environment (inherent in separation-of-powers disputes), could undermine the
respect for law and legal institutions and, at the margin, might reduce its ability in
other settings to deliver real benefits in terms of shaping governmental and
private-sector behavior. In short, under the overseer–decider standard, there may
be the risk that the Constitution will “come[] to serve as a rhetorical football in a
highly polarized ideological game.”52
49 For a recent discussion of the propensity for politicians to change their policy positions, see
generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 501, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2553285 [https://perma.cc/9ZXW-W4CQ].
50 See Parker, supra note 7 (describing Republicans’ characterization of Obama’s presidency as
“imperial” and “dictatorial” while noting that the second Bush administration also expanded the scope
of executive power).
51 Press Release, John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, House Files Litigation over
President’s Unilateral Actions on Health Care Law (Nov. 21, 2014) (retrieved through the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/house-files-litigation-over-presidents-unilateral
-actions-health-care-law [https://perma.cc/QBT4-ENQT]. This suit is, however, based on grounds other
than excessive directive authority. Id.
52 Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 5). This is not to deny that some constitutional
questions, even nonjusticiable ones, may be worth debating in a political setting. See, e.g., KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (1999). Rather, our motivation here is to explore an empirical question. Regardless of any
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II. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND LEGAL NORMS
To begin to assess the potential legitimacy impacts associated with different
executive power norms, and learn more about how the public assigns responsibility
for executive action, we conducted four vignette-based surveys. Vignette-based
research has been used extensively for years in the social sciences,53 and it has also
been relied upon in a number of areas of the law, including torts,54 criminal law,55
and contracts.56 To our knowledge, it has yet to be used to inform doctrinal
decisions and scholarly deliberations in the domain of administrative law.57

benefits, what are the costs produced by embroiling law in political debate? If such costs exceed any
benefits with respect to a certain constitutional issue, this would hardly seem irrelevant to a choice about legal
doctrine. A doctrinal position that only incurs costs, without ever yielding any corresponding benefits, would
seem particularly worrisome.
53 See, e.g., V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE 89-109 (1992)
(describing the vignette method used to measure perceptions of responsibility in wrongdoing within
everyday life in the United States and Japan).
54 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi et al., Does Tort Law Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567, 576-90 (2012) (measuring the deterrent effect of a tort legal regime through
vignettes that ask how individuals would behave in certain real-world situations); Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2095 (1998)
(discussing a series of vignettes on personal injury cases to measure judgments and attitudes toward punitive
damages in tort suits).
55 See, e.g., Mark Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the Permissibility
of Aggregation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 203-09 (2014) (using a vignette study to measure how
individuals would respond to the classic trolley problem); Trent W. Maurer & David W. Robinson, Effects of
Attire, Alcohol, and Gender on Perceptions of Date Rape, 58 SEX ROLES 423, 426-28 (2008) (discussing the study’s
design involving a two-part heterosexual date-rape vignette for U.S. undergraduates in order to measure
students’ perceptions of sexual assault); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive,
and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 273 (2012) (describing an experiment using vignettes to
test the judgments of participants about the elements of criminal liability and whether those are colored by
inferences of the moral character of the transgressor).
56 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Remedies, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 151, 159-74 (using vignettes to measure which contractual legal remedy people prefer); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1762 (2014) (using
vignette studies on consumer consent to fine print in contracts).
57 Cass Sunstein has recently used vignette surveys to study public perceptions about certain
kinds of regulatory design—that is, designs for how agencies or legislatures can structure rules to try
to shape private behavior—but not about the design of norms governing administrative behavior. Cass
R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 185 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, Which
Nudges Do People Like? A National Survey (June 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619899 [https://perma.cc/A3ZD-ULLU]. Others have used nonvignette surveys, of course, in an effort to speak to the design of administrative procedures. See, e.g.,
Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making:
Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599, 600-02 (2000)
(using surveys to assess individuals’ satisfaction with outcomes under negotiated rulemaking as
compared to conventional rulemaking); David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to
Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 12-16 (2008) (using a questionnaire to assess the
procedural preferences of those likely to be involved in environmental litigation).
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Our respondents participated in short survey studies where they read a
scenario about a particular decision involving the President, the Treasury
Secretary, and various other actors. Each subject was randomly assigned to one
of a number of conditions, where we varied aspects of the scenario to determine
which factors influence perceptions of decisionmaking, as well as the legality and
appropriateness of the President’s actions and the legitimacy of the legal system.
The first two studies varied the level of action taken by the President. The
Decisionmaking Study focused on who respondents perceived to be the
“decider” in the vignette, while the Responsibility Study looked at who
respondents thought deserved blame or credit when the results of the
governmental actions in the vignette were said to turn out poorly or well. A
third study, the Disagreement Study, varied whether the President and
Treasury Secretary agreed or disagreed on the desirable outcome, and who
actually authorized the decision. The final study, the Legal Norm Study, used
a different scenario involving the postponement of a compliance deadline and
varied whether the legal norm that was supposed to guide the President’s
action was a rule or a standard.58
Drawing on the findings from these surveys, we can begin to understand
better how people think about the separation of powers, but, more
importantly for our main purpose here, how different doctrinal choices can
affect judgments about the legality and legitimacy of governmental actions.
As explained in the following Sections of this Part, we find evidence
supporting the subtlety of the difference between overseeing and deciding. That
is, while many of our respondents seem to be able to track this difference,
nontrivial portions respond in ways contrary to expectations. More to the
point, though, we find evidence supporting skepticism of the benefits of the
overseer–decider standard: When outcomes turn out badly, respondents
appear, irrespective of legal norms, more likely to blame Presidents when they
were more involved than they are to give Presidents credit for being more

58 The four studies were conducted in the period of July to September, 2015; survey
administration for each study was completed within a two-day window. All respondents were
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were paid either $0.75 or $1.00 each to fill out
an online survey. On the recruitment and consent page of the survey, respondents were told they
would be “answering questions about government decision-making.” The use of MTurk is generally
accepted among both social scientists and legal scholars engaged in empirical research. See, e.g.,
Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 352-66 (2012) (evaluating benefits and tradeoffs of MTurk
and recommending it as a valuable research tool); Joseph K. Goodman et al., Data Collection in a Flat
World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
213, 222 (2013) (“[W]e highly recommend MTurk to behavioral decision-making researchers . . . .”);
David J. Hauser & Norbert Schwarz, Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform Better on Online
Attention Checks than Do Subject Pool Participants, 48 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 400, 405-06 (2016)
(concluding that MTurk participants are more attentive to instructions than are traditional subjects).
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involved when outcomes turn out well. That is, the political risks to the
President who gets involved already seem to provide, on their own, a palpable
constraint on presidential involvement. Most significantly, the results that speak
directly to our principal hypothesis about the effects of legal norms on
perceptions of legitimacy reveal that respondents tend to view judicial decisions
made under the overseer–decider standard as less legitimate than those made
under a formal rule, even controlling for respondents’ substantive views about
the merits of the case.
A. Decisionmaking Study
Our first study examined differences in presidential action levels and
considered who respondents perceived to be the decisionmaker in a scenario
about redesigning security features on the $50 bill.59
1. Methods
We surveyed 591 respondents on MTurk who were randomly assigned to
one of four conditions: neutral, ask, command, or sign.60 These conditions were
intended to increase progressively the amount of involvement that the
President had in the decision to move forward with the redesign.
All of the participants were presented with the following scenario:
Please assume the following.
The Federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing (“Bureau”) carries out the design
and printing of U.S. paper currency. The Bureau recently redesigned the $100 bill to
incorporate new security features and these bills are currently in circulation. The
question now is whether to update the security features in the $50 bill.
Even though it made sense to redesign the $100 bill, there are both pros and cons
to the redesign of the $50 bill. In a meeting at the White House, Bureau staff members
59 For all of our studies, we purposefully tried to choose an issue about which individuals would
not already have strongly held political beliefs because we were interested in their views about executive
power norms; therefore, we sought to minimize the extent to which their views about these norms might
be affected by substantive public policy positions. For additional discussion, see infra Section II.E.
60 Respondents were paid $1.00 each to participate. We began with an MTurk “HIT” requesting
600 participants. In Qualtrics, our survey software, we received 603 fully completed surveys and 7
partially completed surveys. We removed the data for completed surveys that did not match an MTurk
HIT ID, partially completed surveys, and completed surveys that had an ID or IP address that matched
a partially completed survey (to avoid having data from participants who had potentially seen two
versions of the study), which resulted in our final count of 591 participants. All participant data removals
were chosen based on only this information and completed before and independent of any data analysis.
We followed this process for each of the studies in this Article. The respondents in this first study were
50.4% female, and their overall median age was 34 (range 18 to 77). Respondents reported that they were
45.2% Democrat, 17.3% Republican, 32.0% Independent, and 3.9% Other; 1.7% selected the option,
“Prefer not to say.” See Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
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brief the Treasury Secretary and the President of the United States on the pros and cons. At
the conclusion of the meeting, the President thanks the staff for an informative presentation.
The Bureau is situated within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Congress has given
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to make all decisions related to security features
on currency. The Bureau will only begin work on a new design of the $50 bill if it receives
proper written authorization.

Immediately following this text was a sentence indicating the presidential
action (or inaction) that varied by condition. Respondents in the neutral
condition had no additional action by the President and saw the following
sentence: “After the meeting, the Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the
Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”
Respondents in the ask condition saw the following: “After the meeting, the
President asks the Treasury Secretary to move forward with the plans to start the redesign.
The Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”
Respondents in the command condition saw the following: “After the
meeting, the President commands the Treasury Secretary to move forward with the
plans to start the redesign. The Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the
Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”
Finally, respondents in the sign condition saw the following: “After the
meeting, the President signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”
After they were presented with the full scenario, respondents were first asked,
“Should the Bureau now begin work on the redesign of the $50 bill?” in an effort
intended to assess whether they thought proper authorization had indeed been
granted. On the next page, the scenario information continued with, “Assume that
immediately after the document is signed the Bureau starts working on the redesign.”
Respondents were then asked, “Who decided that the redesign work should begin?”
After answering these questions that formed our main dependent
variables, respondents answered a series of other questions assessing the
scenario, presidential actions in general, and the legitimacy of the legal
system in the United States, before answering a few demographic questions.
2. Results
Respondents answered the first question, about whether the Bureau “should”
begin work, on a 7-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” (coded as 1) to
“Definitely Yes” (coded as 7). Table 1 contains the summary of the results.
For the most part, respondents clearly thought the Bureau should begin
work on the redesign. Although still concentrated on the “should” side of the
scale, there were slight but significant differences observed only between the
sign condition and the other conditions. When the President signed the
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authorization document instead of the Treasury Secretary, participants were
significantly less sure that the Bureau should proceed, as compared to the
neutral condition,61 the ask condition,62 and the command condition.63
Our primary dependent variable of interest was the question—presented
after the scenario continued with plans having proceeded—of who made the
decision that the redesign work should begin. Respondents were presented with
four possible options: President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress.64
The answers given by respondents for each question are shown in Table 2.
Since we are primarily concerned here with whether the President is
perceived as the decisionmaker, we focus on whether the President was chosen
as the decider (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0) for the following analysis. There
were significant differences in the expected direction across all two-way
comparisons. The respondents in the neutral group were significantly less likely
on average to view the President as the decider than those in the ask,65
61
62
63
64
65

t=2.73, df=257.8, p=0.007
t=3.04, df=262.5, p=0.003
t=2.73, df=264.2, p=0.007
Answer choices were presented in randomized order.
t=6.67, df=228.9, p<.001
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command,66 and sign67 groups. Ask was less than command68 and sign.69 Finally,
command was also less than sign.70
To analyze these differences further, we performed regression analyses.
The results of these analyses, which included controls for demographics like
age and gender, as well as for self-reported political and policy ideologies, are
reported in Table 3.
After the main dependent variables, we asked the respondents to choose
whether they thought the President was closer to “overseeing” or closer to
“deciding” in the scenario. This was presented as a 7-point scale with only the
endpoints “Overseeing” (coded as 1) and “Deciding” (coded as 7) being labeled.
Respondents in the neutral condition were more likely to say that the President
was closer to “overseeing,” and respondents in the three other conditions were

66
67
68
69
70

t=9.23, df=232.7, p<.001
t=11.79, df=214.7, p<.001
t=2.12, df=298.0, p=0.034
t=4.24, df=285.3, p<.001
t=2.11, df=289.3, p=0.036
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more likely to say that the President was closer to “deciding.” As indicated in Table
4, this was significant when comparing the neutral condition with all three of the
other actions, including ask,71 command,72 and sign.73 No significant differences
were observed between these three types of presidential action.
Respondents were less certain that the Bureau should proceed when the
President was the one who signed the document instead of the Treasury
Secretary (regardless of whether the Treasury Secretary signed immediately,
or whether the President asked or commanded the Treasury Secretary to
move forward). The President was seen as being closer to “deciding” than
overseeing when the President performed any additional action, whether
asking or commanding the Treasury Secretary to move forward, or even
signing directly. In the end, when respondents were asked to determine who
the “decider” was among all of the actors mentioned in the scenario, the
President became increasingly viewed as the decider as the level of
presidential involvement increased across the conditions. The President was
least likely to be viewed as the decider in the neutral (no additional action)
condition, but more likely when asking the Treasury Secretary to move
forward, then still more likely when commanding the Treasury Secretary to
move forward, and, finally, most likely of all when signing the document.
B. Responsibility Study
Our second study examined how differences in the types of presidential
action might affect who respondents perceive as deserving of credit or blame
in the same scenario as in the Decisionmaking Study.

71
72
73

t=8.35, df=288.9, p<.001
t=9.46, df=298.9, p<.001
t=9.79, df=281.1, p<.001
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1. Methods
The introductory scenario for this study was identical to the previous
study, centering on a redesign of the $50 bill.74 Respondents were again
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: neutral, ask, command, or
sign.75 As with the Decisionmaking Study, these conditions progressively
increased the level of presidential involvement in the process to move forward
with the currency redesign.
After the main scenario, respondents read the following additional
paragraph indicating that the redesign had taken place, and then they were
asked who deserved the credit (if the result was positive) or blame (if the
result was negative) for the redesign.
Assume that immediately after the document is signed the Bureau starts working
on the redesign. Upon completion, the redesigned $50 bill is released into general
circulation. Banking and local law enforcement professionals are [happy / unhappy]
with the additional security features. Who deserves [credit / blame] for this?

Respondents were each presented with the same four possible options of
President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress. This time,
they were provided with sliders on a 100-point scale and had to move the
sliders to distribute 100% of the responsibility among the four choices.
2. Results
Summaries of the average credit or blame assigned to each choice by
respondents are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6. As an initial analysis, looking only

74
75

See supra Section II.A.
We surveyed 800 respondents on MTurk who were each paid $1.00 to participate. The respondents
were 45.9% female, and their overall median age was 31 (range 18 to 73). Respondents were 44.1% Democrat,
17.8% Republican, 31.2% Independent, and 3.8% Other; the remaining 3.1% selected “Prefer not to say.” See
Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
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at the level of responsibility assigned to the President (whether it was blame or
credit), we mostly duplicated the decider results from the Decisionmaking Study.
The credit or blame allocated to the President under the neutral condition was
significantly less than under the ask,76 command,77 and sign conditions.78 Ask was less
than sign79 and command was less than sign.80 The only comparison for which
significant differences were not observed was the one between ask and command.81
We continued to look at the level of responsibility assigned to the President
by performing regression analyses to control for demographics and self-reported
policy ideologies. To disentangle differences based on whether the question was
phrased as credit or blame, we provide full data models that include the question
type as an independent variable, as well as partial results for each of the credit
and blame versions individually. These results are reported in Table 7.
Regardless of how the responsibility question was phrased, the level of
presidential action appeared to affect significantly the amount of credit or
blame assigned to the President. We looked further at differences between
credit and blame by condition, and a difference emerged in the command
condition. When the President commanded that action be taken, the mean
credit assigned to the President was 23.7% when things turned out well, while
the blame assigned to the President was 33.9% when things did not go well—a
difference that was significant.82 This was also true in the responses on the
seven-point overseeing–deciding scale. For respondents in the credit version,
after being told how the redesign was ultimately received, the mean result was

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

t=10.73, df=291.1, p<.001
t=10.70, df=276.1, p<.001
t=8.77, df=319.3, p<.001
t=2.56, df=385.1, p=0.011
t=3.27, df=370.6, p=0.001
t=0.84, df=393.6, p=0.403
t=3.12, df=181.8, p=0.002

1890

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1869

3.9, which was just below the halfway point of 4, on the “overseeing” side. For
respondents in the blame version, the mean result was 5.1, which was on the
“deciding” end. This was, again, a statistically significant difference.83
In summary, although the Responsibility Study showed similar results when
looking at the same variations in levels of presidential involvement as in the
Decisionmaking Study, it revealed differences in how the President reaped
credit and blame when commanding policy outcomes. Both the blame and credit
groups saw that the President commanded the Treasury Secretary to move
forward, but respondents who read about the decision going poorly were more
likely to assign blame to the President and more likely to say that the President
was the one who was “deciding” in the scenario.

83

t=4.11, df=198.2, p<.001
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C. Disagreement Study
Our third study examined how differences in viewpoints between the
President and Treasury Secretary affected respondents’ perceptions of who
was the “decider.” Again, we used the same scenario as in the Decisionmaking
Study about redesigning the security features on the $50 bill.
1. Methods
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: agree-secretarysigns, disagree-secretary-signs, agree-president-signs, or disagree-president-signs.84
These conditions varied the agreement between the President and Treasury
Secretary over whether to move forward with a currency redesign, and they
varied in who expressed a preference versus who signed a document directing
the redesign. The scenario text was the same as in Section II.A. Respondents
in the conditions with the Treasury Secretary signing the document were
presented with the following:
After the meeting, the President expresses a preference to the Treasury Secretary that
plans [should / should not] move forward to start the redesign. The Treasury Secretary
[agrees / disagrees] and signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.

Respondents in the conditions with the President signing the document saw
this version:
After the meeting, the Treasury Secretary expresses a preference to the President
that plans [should / should not] move forward to start the redesign. The President
[agrees / disagrees] and signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.

All respondents then saw the same questions as indicated in the
Decisionmaking Study, beginning with whether the Bureau should proceed
with the redesign, and then who the “decider” was.
2. Results
Respondents answered the first question—about whether the Bureau should
commence work—based on a 7-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” (coded
as 1) to “Definitely Yes” (coded as 7). Table 8 contains a summary of the results.

84 We surveyed 589 respondents on MTurk who were each paid $1.00 to participate. The
respondents were 45.5% female, and their overall median age was 31 (range 18 to 78). Respondents were
45.3% Democrat, 15.1% Republican, 33.4% Independent, and 3.6% Other; the remaining 2.5% chose
“Prefer not to say.” See Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
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Respondents still thought the Bureau should begin work on the redesign,
but there were significant differences in how close they were to the
“Definitely Yes” end of the scale, depending on whether the President and
Treasury Secretary agreed. When the Treasury Secretary signed the
document, respondents were significantly less sure that the Bureau should
move forward if the President expressed a preference for not moving forward,
compared to when the President agreed that the redesign should go ahead.85
Similarly, when the President signed the document, respondents were
significantly less sure that the Bureau should move forward if the Treasury
Secretary expressed a preference for not moving forward, compared to when the
Secretary agreed with the President to go ahead.86 Respondents’ views appeared
to be affected by the existence of agreement (or disagreement) between the
President and Treasury Secretary and not by who signed the authorization. We
observed no significant differences in views about whether the Bureau should
move forward when comparing overall responses in the conditions with the
85
86

t=5.35, df=279.1, p<.001
t=5.47, df=259.5, p<.001
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President signing versus the Secretary signing.87 Nor did we observe any
differences based on who signed within each of the two agreement conditions,
namely just comparing who signed when the President and Secretary agreed88
and then separately comparing responses when they disagreed. 89
Similar to the Decisionmaking Study, we presented the next question
after the scenario, asking who made the decision that the redesign work
should begin. Respondents were presented with the same four possible
options: President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress.90 The
answers given for each question are provided in Table 9.
Again, we focused our attention on whether the President was chosen as the
decider (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The presence of disagreement between
the President and the Treasury Secretary led to significant differences in whether
the President was chosen as the decider. When they disagreed, the President was
significantly more likely to be chosen as the decider when the President signed

87
88
89
90

t=0.94, df=585.2, p=0.346
t=0.69, df=290.0, p=0.493
t=0.80, df=292.7, p=0.424
Answer choices were presented in randomized order.
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compared to when the Treasury Secretary signed.91 Also, when the same
individual signed, significant differences appeared in judgments about the
decider based on whether the President and Treasury Secretary were in
agreement. When the Treasury Secretary signed, the President was
significantly less likely to be thought of as the decider if the President had
expressed a preference for not moving forward.92 When the President
signed, the President was significantly more likely to be viewed as the
decider if the Treasury Secretary had expressed a preference for not moving
forward.93 However, notably, when the President and Treasury Secretary
were in agreement, there was no observed difference in whether the
President was chosen based on who signed.94
To analyze these differences further, we performed regression analyses
controlling for demographics and political ideologies and separating out the
variations in the two conditions, of who signed and of agreement. Regression
results are reported in Table 10.
After the main dependent variables, we asked the respondents to choose
whether they thought the President was closer to “overseeing” or closer to
“deciding” in the scenario. This was presented as a 7-point scale with only the
end-points “Overseeing” (coded as 1) and “Deciding” (coded as 7) being labeled.
As Table 11 shows, these results matched very closely with the decider
results in this study. When the President and Treasury Secretary disagreed,
and the President signed the authorizing document, respondents were
significantly more likely to say the President was “deciding” compared to
when the Treasury Secretary signed.95 When the President and Treasury
Secretary were in agreement, there was no difference observed.96 When the
Treasury Secretary signed, the President was closer to “overseeing” if the
President had expressed a preference for not moving forward.97 When the
President signed, the President was closer to “deciding” if the Treasury
Secretary had expressed a preference for not moving forward.98
In summary, respondents were less certain that the Bureau should proceed
when the President and the Treasury Secretary disagreed about whether to move
forward (regardless of who signed). The President was seen as being closer to
“deciding” than “overseeing” when the President signed or when the Treasury
Secretary signed and both parties agreed about moving forward. The President
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

t=19.29, df=181.9, p<.001
t=8.39, df=176.4, p<.001
t=5.55, df=281.6, p<.001
t=1.28, df=289.6, p=0.200
t=13.90, df=293.3, p<.001
t=1.22, df=288.7, p=0.225
t=7.61, df=291.6, p<.001
t=6.72, df=283.4, p<.001
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was seen as being closer to “overseeing” when the Treasury Secretary signed and
they disagreed about moving forward. Finally, when determining who the
“decider” was among all of the actors mentioned in the scenario, the President
was more likely to be considered the decider when the President signed or when
the Treasury Secretary signed and both parties were in agreement.
D. Legal Norm Study
The fourth study used a new scenario to examine how differences in the type
of legal norm that a court would be expected to apply in a lawsuit may affect the
legitimacy of a court’s decision about the legality of a President’s action. This
scenario also used the Treasury Secretary and President as protagonists, but this
time the scenario centered on amendments to credit card security regulations.
1. Methods
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three norm conditions: formal,
reasonable, or decision.99 These conditions varied whether the prevailing legal norm
was a bright-line rule or a standard, using either reasonableness language or
overseer–decider language.
All of the participants were presented with the following scenario:
Please assume the following.
Congress has given the Secretary of Treasury the authority to make all decisions
related to security features on credit cards. That includes the authority to create and

99 We surveyed 298 respondents on MTurk who were each paid $0.75 to participate. The
respondents were 49.0% female, and their overall median age was 33 (range 18 to 77). Respondents were
39.9% Democrat, 19.5% Republican, 36.6% Independent, and 2.3% Other; the remaining 1.7% selected an
option, “Prefer not to say.” See Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
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amend credit card security regulations, as well as to respond to petitions about these
regulations, whenever and however the Secretary decides.
Some years ago, the Treasury Department used the authority Congress gave the
Secretary to create a regulation that required many businesses to install a new antifraud security technology. The regulation allowed businesses a limited time period
within which to come into compliance.
As the regulation’s deadline approached, it became clear that most businesses would
not have completed the required installations in time. Several business groups jointly filed
a petition asking the Treasury Secretary to amend the regulation to extend the deadline.
The Treasury Secretary wanted to keep the regulation unchanged. However,
hearing the concerns raised by business groups and concluding that the impending
deadline would pose potentially serious economic repercussions, the President of the
United States commanded the Treasury Secretary to grant the petition and amend
the regulation to extend the deadline.
The Treasury Department then used normal procedures to grant the petition and
amend the regulation, issuing a deadline extension.
The amended regulation was then challenged in a lawsuit in federal court. The
challengers’ lawyers argued that the President illegally pressured the Treasury
Secretary to relax the deadline. They pointed out that Congress had given regulatory
authority to the Treasury Secretary and not to the President.
In response, government lawyers pointed out that a Treasury Secretary is
appointed by the President, who can remove a Secretary from office at any time.
In similar lawsuits in the past involving other government departments, courts have
applied a rule derived from the U.S. Constitution that says [NORM]. This is the law
the judge must apply to the dispute over the Treasury Department’s deadline extension.

The “[NORM]” in the last paragraph varied by condition. Respondents in
the formal condition saw the following:
Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury
Secretary, as long as departmental regulations (including amendments) are officially
signed and approved by the department head and not the President.

Respondents in the reasonable condition saw,
Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury Secretary,
as long as they only do so in “reasonable” ways.

Respondents in the decision condition saw the overseer–decider standard:
Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury Secretary,
but not to make decisions for them.

Respondents were first asked to evaluate their own opinion of the legality
of the President’s actions. They were asked, “Based on your reading of this
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scenario and on the law that the judge must apply, do you think the President acted
legally or illegally?” Respondents chose either “Illegally” (coded as 0) or
“Legally” (coded as 1).100
On the next page of the survey, respondents were reminded of the norm
and further instructed, “Please now assume further that the judge decided the
President did act legally.” Then they were asked to evaluate the decision by
choosing agreement on a seven-point scale with the following statements:
-The judge’s decision is legitimate.
-The judge made the decision fairly on the basis of the facts and the law.
-Political ideology or bias likely entered into the judge’s decision.

2. Results
Respondents’ answers to the question about the legality of the President’s
action are summarized in Table 12. Performing two-way comparisons between
the norms and answers to legality, there is only one significant difference:
respondents were more likely to say the President’s action was legal when the
norm type was formal than they were when the norm type was decision (i.e.,
overseer–decider).101 These results are duplicated in regressions in Table 13.
Respondents’ perceptions of the judge’s decision were combined to form
a total judge legitimacy score of up to 21 points.102 A higher judge legitimacy
score indicates a greater level of agreement with the legitimacy and fairness
statements, and a greater level of disagreement with the bias statement. A
summary of the individual answers and total scores can be found in Table 14.
Considering two-way comparisons, the average judge legitimacy score is
significantly higher when the norm type is formal rather than reasonable103 or

100 Respondents were then asked, “How confident do you feel about your answer above?” But, these
responses did not vary widely (with most people choosing the midpoint), so we do not discuss them further.
101 t=2.68, df=190.4, p=0.008
102 Cronbach’s Alpha for the 3-item judge legitimacy score is 0.8 (standardized is 0.89), which
is considered reliable.
103 t=2.88, df=193.4, p=0.004
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decision.104 The two standard types—reasonable and decision—do not show any
observable, statistically significant differences in the judge legitimacy score.105
However, these comparisons do not take into account the differences in
respondents’ perceived legality of the President’s actions.
Table 15 contains regressions that control for demographics as well as for
whether respondents thought the President acted legally and how confident they
were in their conclusions. Even though perceived legality accounts for some of
the differences between conditions, there are still additional differences that are
being observed when controlling for this perceived legality.
In summary, respondents were more likely to view the President as acting
legally when the norm was a formal signature rule than they were when it was
the overseer–decider standard. Yet, when a judge decided the President acted
legally, respondents were more likely to view the judge’s decision as legitimate,

104
105

t=4.58, df=191.9, p<.001
t=1.66, df=195.8, p=0.099
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fair, and unbiased when the norm was formal than they were when it was either
of the two standards. This difference remained even after controlling for the
perceived legality of the President’s actions.
E. Synopsis: Contributions and Robustness
These experimental studies provide new insights into how laypeople assess
executive and judicial actors in the context of separation-of-powers issues that
until now have escaped systematic empirical scrutiny. Our studies illuminate
when individuals may be more (or less) ready to assign responsibility, whether
based on the actions of the President or agency actors, or based on messages
which are carefully crafted by the White House, agencies, or the media about
those actions. We have shown that individuals are sensitive both to the level of
presidential involvement in administrative decisionmaking as well as to the nature
of the legal norms concerning this involvement that they are informed prevail.
In addition to our findings about the effect of norm type on assessments of
legitimacy, we have shown that individuals are sensitive to the level of presidential
involvement in an administrative decision. When merely being briefed on the
issues, the President is not perceived to be the “decider” of the outcome, compared
to when the President takes an explicit action, like asking or commanding a
department head; however, in any of these other cases, individuals still think that
the President’s direction should nonetheless be followed by the administrative
agency. If the President explicitly bypasses the authority of the department head
by directly signing the applicable legal documents, though, individuals begin to
question whether the agency should proceed with the presidential direction.
Furthermore, individuals are discriminating when it comes to allocating
credit and blame. They are generally more willing to assign blame to the
President when there are poor outcomes than they are to give him credit when
things go well. We have also shown that individuals apportion decisionmaking
responsibility differently based on whether the President and department head
find themselves in agreement. When it is obvious that the executive branch is
working in sync, formalities such as signing matter less; but, if there is
disagreement, then individuals consider whose preference was carried out,
regardless of the hierarchy of authority.
We do acknowledge, of course, that these findings from our vignettebased experimental research, like those from any such research, have their
limitations. For one thing, vignettes are, by definition, artificial. Outside of
the experimental setting of a survey, public impressions on issues like those
we have measured would be formed after exposure to multiple sources of
potentially conflicting information, where it would probably not be as easy
for members of the public to know exactly what had happened. However,
using our simplified scenario with clear behavior allows us to capture how
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individuals are influenced by the precise factors that we sought to investigate.
This distinctive advantage of a vignette-based experimental method is
undoubtedly why it is a well-accepted research strategy used in other legal
domains, where it has also proven suitable for producing empirical insight
under the constraints inherent in studying choices about legal doctrine.
We recognize, of course, that with respect to the presidency, members of
the public are, in their daily lives, often exposed to highly politicized and salient
issues of the kind covered in the media, while our four studies rely on fact
patterns that deliberately avoided highly salient political issues. We made that
decision self-consciously for appropriate research design reasons. Our principal
aim has been to assess the effects of rules versus standards on public perceptions
of the legitimacy of the law, not to capture the indisputably real effects of
political ideology that would color judgments about highly salient, politicized
issues.106 By choosing less salient examples, we were able to isolate better our
respondents’ perceptions of responsibility and legitimacy, rather than of
partisanship. We also instructed respondents explicitly that the vignettes
were “hypothetical.” In these ways, our methodology allowed us to
measure independently just the effects of our experimental manipulations,
such as the level of presidential involvement or the nature of the
applicable legal norm.
Our decision to focus on less contentious issues is reinforced by other
empirical research demonstrating that politicization of legal actors and
institutions significantly weakens public legitimacy in these institutions.107 At
the same time that we excluded politically salient facts from our vignettes to
isolate the effects of the conditions we manipulated, such as differences in
legal norms, we recognize we could not study here the extent to which the
presence of such politically salient facts might exacerbate the negative effects
on legitimacy that we did find. Not only would the presence of politicized
elements in real-world disputes presumably have their own independent
effects on legitimacy, but we would hypothesize that politicization would
interact with the overseer–decider standard to heighten the threats to
legitimacy we observed. After all, it will surely be easier for a fuzzy standard
than a clear rule to become manipulated and deployed inconsistently when
106 In a relevant paper, political scientists Andrew Reeves and Jon Rogowski provide evidence
showing that individuals’ partisanship affects their judgments about the unilateral exercise of power
by the President. Andrew Reeves & Jon C. Rogowski, Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the
Presidency, 78 J. POL. 137, 139 (2016). However, they also find evidence that voters can and do
“distinguish the president from the presidency.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added). We are, in this phraseology,
much more interested in perceptions about the presidency—and ultimately in the law—than in
judgments about any specific President. Cf. TYLER, supra note 38, at 29-30 (distinguishing support for
institutions from support for those who lead them).
107 See, e.g., GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 38, at 120 (“Anything that drags the Court into
ordinary politics damages the esteem of the institution.”).
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politics enters the scene. Further investigation of the precise extent of this
possible interactive effect will need to await future research.
We did, however, conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that our
results were not affected by possible bias in the party affiliations or political
ideologies of the respondents. The source of our samples, MTurk, does yield
respondents in levels disproportionate to the U.S. population in terms of
political party affiliation, which was the case for our samples. In the four
studies we report here, we did not give any names or party identification to
any of the protagonists in the vignettes. Of course, we still controlled for
respondents’ partisan affiliations and social and economic policy ideologies in
our regression analyses. In addition to controlling for party affiliations and
policy ideologies, we also ran party-weighted versions of every OLS
regression reported in this Article. Weighting adjusts for differences in
sample size and is a well-accepted statistical approach used in circumstances
similar to ours. For all of the regressions across all of our studies, weighting
returned similar results.108 Our robustness checks lend further confidence to
our findings, notwithstanding the sampling tendencies associated with our
source of respondents.
Finally, we strived to ensure that our results were not affected by the
possibility—given that our vignettes did not name a specific President of the
United States—that our respondents were simply assuming that the vignette
described actions by the current President, Barack Obama. If this were the
case, we could have expected that party affiliation would have influenced our
results. But as we just noted, our results were affected neither by political
ideology nor by party affiliation. Nevertheless, we recognized the possibility
that heightening the salience and reality of the vignette by naming a specific
President could affect respondents’ answers, especially since this possibility
has been realized in other surveys.109 Although some of our respondents in
our four studies probably did assume the vignette was about President
108 We also replicated on a party-weighted basis all the t-tests reported throughout the footnotes of
this Article. All of the replicated t-tests also generated similar results after weighting, with one exception in
which a single previously reported significant result became statistically insignificant. That one difference
arose in the Decisionmaking Study’s comparison of whether the President was perceived as the decider
between the command and sign conditions. Our earlier reported t-test result was significant with a p-value of
0.036. See supra note 70. However, the weighted t-test result was not significant. (t=1.23, df=270.93, p=0.221).
Considering just the group most underweighted originally, Republicans, the mean value of command (0.44)
was still less than the mean value of sign (0.63). This difference was not statistically significant (t=-1.43,
df=50.6, p=0.159), but that is possibly due to the small sample size of n=25 and n=30, respectively.
109 Attaching President Obama’s name to actions can lead to different results than a neutral action.
See, e.g., Roberta Rampton, Most Americans Support Obama’s Contested Immigration Plan: Poll, REUTERS (Jan.
28, 2016, 6:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-immigration-idUSKCN0V617V?feed
Type=RSS&feedName=domesticNews [https://perma.cc/6D32-NXWA] (reporting poll results indicating
that “[m]ost Americans say they back a plan that would allow certain illegal immigrants to stay in the country,
but support for the idea slips when President Barack Obama’s name is attached to the question”).
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Obama, we believe that it was at most a very small minority who did so. We
reach this judgment because we subsequently ran a separate study that
included a replication of our Legal Norm Study as well as a question to check
for this possibility. After asking the other experimental questions, we asked
our respondents which President had been referred to in the vignette (even
though the vignette did not name any President). Only 14% of our respondents
answered that they either presumed or thought they remembered that it was
President Barack Obama.110
Future work could undoubtedly build on the work we have presented
here. Other research could pursue scenarios with different policy issues and
other governmental departments or offices. Researchers could also build on
our framework to seek to assess how respondents’ attitudes might vary
depending on the level of certainty about a President’s involvement, perhaps
by exposing them to multiple or conflicting sources of information.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE POWER NORMS
Our results provide what we believe to be the first window into the ways that
a broad cross-section of the public thinks about interbranch interactions under
different formulations of separation-of-powers norms. Although these results
reveal points of convergence with expectations, they also reveal subtle differences
in the effects of different legal doctrines, and they raise important questions
about potential costs of choices in the language of legal norms or the actions taken
by Presidents. In this Part, we discuss some of the implications of what can be
learned from these studies for understanding and assessing executive power
norms. Overall, our findings raise new, important questions about the advisability
of scholars, lawyers, and politicians continuing to invoke an overseer–decider
standard as a purported constraint on presidential administration.
A. The Subtlety of Decisions and the Clarity of Bright-Line Rules
Our findings not only confirm the subtlety of the overseer–decider
standard and its application with a large cross-section of the public, but they
also suggest some additional potential limitations associated with the
standard that might apply to those who inhabit the world of governmental
agencies. We did find, as expected, that our respondents perceived the
President to be more of a decider the greater the degree and formality of the
President’s involvement in the process. But this was merely the trend.
Strikingly, more than 35% of the respondents in the Decisionmaking Study
110 In addition to responses that specifically mentioned President Obama by name, we liberally included
all answers that could have been remotely referring to President Obama, such as those stating “the current
President” or “current one.”
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did not view the President as “the decider” even when the President signed a
document giving formal authorization of the currency redesign. Those 35%,
moreover, did not all coalesce around the same non-presidential actor as the
decider. This is an interesting result that suggests an additional, unacknowledged
conceptual challenge presented by the overseer–decider standard. The standard
may be subtle not merely because it is difficult to draw the line between
“oversight” and “decision”; it may be subtle and difficult to apply in circumstances
involving collective decisionmaking—precisely as exists in government.111 When
different individuals from multiple offices and across the legislative and
executive branches are involved, is it ever possible to consider any single
individual as “the decider”? Who really can be said to be “the” decider in a
system of checks and balances?
The line-drawing that the overseer–decider standard demands becomes
even more challenging when making more fine-grained judgments. Once
respondents were asked about the degree of deciding versus overseeing, there
were no differences at all across the different levels of presidential
involvement. That is, Presidents are viewed as more of the decider once they get
involved at all—regardless of what form their involvement takes. Even if they
are just asking and trying to influence—that is, “overseeing”—they are
perceived by the public to be more of the decider. The degree to which
Presidents are seen as the decider does not change if they are asking or
commanding their cabinet officials, or even if they actually take over the
signing of authorizing documents, all other things being equal.
Of course, all other things are not always equal. The Disagreement Study
shows that respondents’ judgments vary about who was the decider, as well as
about the degree of deciding versus overseeing, depending on whether Presidents
and their cabinet officials agree or disagree about a course of action. When
Presidents and cabinet officials disagree, respondents are more likely to see
whoever gets their way by signing the authorizing documents as being more of
the decider. This is as would be expected. After all, when the Bush EPA denied
California’s waiver, critics drew significance from reports that EPA officials
disagreed and had been ready to grant the waiver request up until the time that
Administrator Johnson had his meeting at the White House.112 The existence of
disagreement apparently makes respondents indifferent as to who signs the
authorization document, notwithstanding the fact that they are aware that
Congress has given the administrator the decisionmaking authority. In our
Decisionmaking Study, respondents were less likely to report that the Bureau
111 For a recent account emphasizing the multiplicity of decisionmaking actors in the
administrative state, see Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1157-60 (2014).
112 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
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should proceed with the bill redesign when the President signed an authorization
document versus the Secretary, but in the Disagreement Study that difference
disappeared. Disagreement seems to be all that matters.
B. Constraints on Presidential Involvement in Administration
Disagreement is also the condition under which the principal benefit of the
overseer–decider standard is supposed to be realized. The standard does not matter
when the President and administrator agree. It is when they disagree that the
existence of the overseer–decider standard is supposed to bolster the
administrator’s fortitude to resist obeying a President’s command. As Professor
Strauss has argued, “Distinguishing the legal from the political . . . reinforces the
psychology of office.”113 The overseer–decider standard tells administrators that
they are not legally obligated to substitute the President’s judgment for their own.
If the President persuades them of the wisdom of his position, that is one thing.
But if administrators should remain unpersuaded, they have no legal duty to obey.
It then becomes a matter of administrators and Presidents making political risk
management judgments. How likely is it that the President would really fire an
administrator or accept a tendered letter of resignation? How much cost would the
White House incur over a firing or resignation related to a disagreement?
These are key questions. However, as one of us has explained elsewhere, they
are questions that can arise regardless of whether the overseer–decider standard
is accepted as a matter of constitutional law.114 Since the standard at best only
operates within administrators’ and Presidents’ (and their staffs’) minds—and
not as something enforceable in a court—then one would expect these tactical,
political questions about resignation and replacement to dominate anyway. They
raise the only potential consequences confronting administrators and Presidents
when they disagree; the purported standard of constitutional law is not only
subtle, but provides no tangible incentives or consequences for either
administrators or the White House.
Perhaps if administrators could psychologically internalize the overseer–decider
standard, the standard could help reinforce their backbones so that they make
independent judgments about how to implement the statutes they are responsible
for carrying out. If one imagines the kinds of people who head administrative

113
114

Strauss, supra note 25, at 714.
See Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 24) (explaining that while “partisans tend to
view constitutional claims about presidential control of domestic policymaking using their own
ideological lens . . . [t]he murkiness of the asserted legal doctrine would inherently limit its ability
to come to the political appointee’s aid in resisting a motivated White House bent on using its
available incentives to influence the administrator”); see also Coglianese, supra note 39, at 645 (“[T]he
supposed constitutional rule limiting Presidents to mere oversight of agencies is incapable of
neutrally circumscribing either presidential or administrative behavior.”).
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agencies to be timid and meek, with very few strong opinions of their own,
then perhaps the overseer–decider standard would be beneficial, even if it
provides no judicially manageable standard.115 Professor Strauss, at least,
appears to hold that view, as he writes about the “tendencies both of some
leaders to appoint yes-men, and of other appointees (those not meeting this
description) to feel the impulses of political loyalty to a respected superior
and of a wish for job continuity.”116 This is an empirical claim, but there is
much in the political science literature that could reasonably lead one to
question it. Rather than presidential appointees being proverbial “yes-men,”
the tendency appears to be the opposite. Appointees are accomplished leaders
in their own right. They often have worked in a professional field related to
the agency or otherwise have an interest in the agency’s policy domain.
Obviously they may well start out by sharing many of the same views as the
President who appoints them, but when they disagree, they presumably do so
because of strongly held opinions or well-thought-out professional
judgments. It seems doubtful that they would automatically fold were it not
for the overseer–decider standard. On the contrary, it is commonly said that
appointees have a tendency to “go native,” coming to see the world from their
agency staff ’s perspective, rather than the White House staff ’s, and hence not
automatically assuming the priorities and perspectives of the President.117
Richard Neustadt had valid reasons for concluding that a President’s most
important power is the “power to persuade.”118
Of course, the degree to which administrators shrink in the face of
presidential disagreement cannot be answered by our research. We did not study
the behavior of elites who hold presidential appointments, and we also do not
draw inferences about how presidential appointees behave under the different
normative doctrines we studied. On the other hand, no one who has claimed
115 The psychological internalization might be reinforced by the existence of informal, nonlegal
norms or conventions, if not legal ones. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1186 (2013) (explaining how a convention can constrain
administrative behavior, especially when it “becomes genuinely internalized by the actor as a rule of
political morality”).
116 Strauss, supra note 25, at 714.
117 Political scientist Richard Nathan attributes to President Richard Nixon’s aide, John
Ehrlichman, the original use of this phrase to describe presidential appointees’ tendencies to assimilate
into their agencies’ settings. Richard P. Nathan, The “Administrative Presidency,” 44 PUB. INT. 40, 44
(1976). The phrase remains used by White House officials. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A.
Chief and President Walk Fine Line, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2014, at A1 (reporting that advisors to President
Obama were concerned that “since being appointed director” of the Central Intelligence Agency, John
O. Brennan “has ‘gone native,’ as they put it”); Dana Milbank, Bush Seeks to Rule the Bureaucracy;
Appointments Aim at White House Control, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2004, at A4 (quoting President Bill
Clinton’s advisor, Bruce Reed, as saying, “When people take jobs at agencies, they tend to go native and
start championing the institution rather than the agenda of the person who put them there”).
118 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 11 (1980).
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that the overseer–decider standard is needed to boost administrators’ fortitude
has put forward any empirical evidence whatsoever in support of that claim.
The appropriate empirical test, in any event, would not be whether the
overseer–decider standard is better than no norm whatsoever. It would instead
be whether such a standard leads to a more optimal level of fortitude relative to
the level induced by an alternative norm. We used one such alternative norm in
our research: a bright-line rule that holds that, given a statutory delegation of
authority to an administrator, the administrator’s signature, and only the
administrator’s signature, can properly authorize action. Such a rule today
appears to be widely honored, and occasions have arisen when White House
officials have been unable to get their way because administrative officials have
refused to sign off, literally, on actions presidential aides sought to have
approved.119 Importantly, such a bright-line rule is also judicially manageable. A
court would surely be willing to entertain an ultra vires claim if the White House
Chief of Staff—or even the President—were to sign a waiver for California to
develop automobile emissions standards instead of the EPA Administrator.
Our research offers relevant findings that cast doubt on the magnitude of any
marginally constraining effects the overseer–decider standard may have in terms
of reducing presidential overreach. Our Responsibility Study investigated how
the public distributes credit and blame for administrative actions, and we found
that members of the public are much more prone to blame the President when
something goes wrong if the President “commands” rather than “asks.” These
findings suggest a political incentive that presumably already serves to keep
Presidents hewing to something like the overseer–decider line, even without any
meaningful legal consequences associated with that line.120 Any President
concerned about public opinion appears to face intrinsic risks when getting more
heavily involved in administrative actions should things turn out badly.121 The
Responsibility Study shows an asymmetry in how the public will blame a
President when things go badly compared to the credit they will give the
President when things go well. If these political risks already serve to constrain
presidential overreach, any additional marginal effect that might be added from
a legal standard based on oversight versus deciding will presumably be much
smaller than commonly supposed, to the extent such an effect really exists at all.
119 For a dramatic account of one such occasion involving former Attorney General Ashcroft,
see Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 25).
120 For analyses supporting a similar position that presidential power operates within important
nonlegal constraints, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 75-81
(2010); Eric Posner, Presidential Leadership and the Separation of Powers 6-9 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 545, 2015), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664409 [https://perma.cc/EH8H-UDD5].
121 In an era of frequent media leaks and extensive electronic trails, these risks cannot be dismissed
out of hand simply due to the (relative) secrecy that ordinarily surrounds presidential deliberations.
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C. Preserving Law’s Legitimacy
Most strikingly, our research confirms our hypothesis that invoking the
overseer–decider standard as a constitutional norm is not a costless exercise.
The form that separation-of-powers doctrine takes appears to shape
perceptions about fairness, bias, and legitimacy. In the Legal Norm Study,
both standards were, relative to a formal rule, negatively associated with
respondents’ judgments about the legitimacy of a judicial finding that the
President acted legally.
We recognize, of course, that since the hypothetical court decision found
the President had acted legally, it would be more likely under either the
reasonableness standard or the overseer–decider standard for a respondent
to question the court’s legal judgment, as the two standards are, as a
substantive matter, less advantageous to the President. The standards
qualify, in some manner, the President’s authority in a way that the formal
rule does not. However, the regression results make clear that when we control for
the substantive difference in the effect of the norm as reflected in respondents’
own judgments of legality, people are still less likely to view a judge’s decision as
legitimate under either of the two standards than under the formal rule.
It is striking that we see a distinct and statistically significant diminution in
public perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal system just by varying a single
sentence describing how a norm about separation of powers might be expressed.
Of course, perhaps for some judges and legal scholars, these findings will merely
confirm what they have already long intuited when deciding separation-of-powers
disputes.122 In articulating the political question doctrine, for example, the
Supreme Court has emphasized caution about entering into disputes involving
the powers of other branches of government, especially when the courts lack clear
legal rules to apply.123 Some widely noted separation-of-powers cases have been
decided on the basis of bright-line rules,124 and, over the years, judges and scholars
122 In other contexts, as well, empirical research shows that “rule-based decisionmaking” is generally
positively associated with an increase in public perceptions of legitimacy in legal actors and institutions. See,
e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on
Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 678-80 (2007) (summarizing the results of a series of empirical
studies finding that support for legal authorities increases when they act consistent with “principles underlying
the rule of law,” including “rule-based decisionmaking”).
123 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“We have said that ‘In determining whether a
question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of
government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory
criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939))). For contemporary analysis of the political
question doctrine, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
124 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (finding unconstitutional statutory language
authorizing a legislative veto because “Congress can implement [policy] in only one way; bicameral passage
followed by presentment to the President”).
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have advocated for taking more formalist approaches in separation-of-powers
cases.125 With the addition of our research findings, judges and scholars now have
empirical evidence indicating that, in addition to traditional legal and interpretive
issues, something else appears to be at stake in the debate over norms of executive
power: public perceptions of the legitimacy of law.
CONCLUSION
When resolving interbranch disputes, the Constitution’s text and history
matter, as do broader values such as democracy, individual liberty, and the
rule of law. Yet, as significant as the normative values underlying these
questions are, values themselves will only go so far. If administrative law
generally, and separation-of-powers doctrine in particular, stand to reinforce
or induce governmental behavior that is normatively defensible (or at least
reduce governmental behavior that is normatively objectionable), then any
analysis of doctrinal choices should also be informed by empirical analysis.
To inform efforts to move closer to a normative optimum, we need to
understand better the empirical impact of administrative law. In the interbranch
context, law operates under much different institutional conditions. The branches
being coordinate, legal doctrine is not applied by a judiciary in the same
hierarchical fashion as it usually is in other contexts. In addition, the behavioral
import of legal doctrine in other settings presumably benefits from cooperation
and mutual reinforcement by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
Such cooperation obviously does not exist when interbranch disputes arise. And
of course, interbranch disputes are by definition highly political. The executive and
legislative branches, if not also the judiciary, hold extremely high institutional stakes
in the outcomes of these disputes. If law is anywhere little more than politics in
disguise, such a venue presumably would lie in the realm of separation of powers.
Taking into account these challenging circumstances under which
administrative law operates, it seems prudent to understand how specific types
of doctrinal formulations affect public perceptions of legitimacy. In the

125 Formalism in the separation-of-powers context is often equated with an attempt to divide the federal
government into three tidy branches, which, of course, other judges and scholars have rejected as unrealistic
or simplistic. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation
of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 27-28 (1998) (“The Framers did not see such a profound gulf
between form and function, and neither should we today.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches
in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608 (2001) (arguing that “distinguishing . . . among
legislative, executive, and judicial powers” is not a “helpful starting point” for separation-of-powers analysis);
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) (“[O]ur formal, three-branch theory of government—at least as
traditionally expressed—cannot describe the government we long have had . . . and is not necessary to
preserve the very real and desirable benefits of ‘separation of powers’ that form so fundamental an element of
our constitutional scheme.”).
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separation-of-powers context, to ask whether a particular doctrinal resolution
is truly pro-executive or pro-legislative, or whether a formalistic or functionalist
test better achieves a desired balance, is to ask an empirical question. Given
how little is actually known about how doctrine and its different formulations
affect governmental behavior and public perceptions, we offer this analysis to
illuminate some of the consequences associated with choices about norms
governing the governmental process, as well as to show what else is at stake in
the particular debate over norms applicable to the President’s role in the
administrative state.
In addition to offering new insights about how members of the public
perceive responsibility in the administrative state and how different legal
norms affect their views of legitimacy, we offer a path forward for additional
research to assess how other administrative law doctrines may shape public
perceptions of government and its legitimacy. When the House of Representatives
sues the President, for example, any resulting court decision will not only have
the potential to create a new equilibrium in the separation-of-powers game
played by both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; it also has the potential to affect,
for good or for ill, public perceptions of Congress, the presidency, the courts,
or all three branches. Given that administrative law inherently aims to shape
how government operates, further empirical research on the relationship
between legal norms and public legitimacy will prove invaluable, especially
in an era of declining trust in governmental institutions and of persistent
concern about the law’s legitimacy.126

126 See, e.g., John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 19581996 (analyzing “the decline in trust in government” for “different demographic and political
subgroups” over a period of approximately forty years), in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT
THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 28-29 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001);
WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT 1-18 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, & David
C. King eds., 1997) (providing an overview of the decline of confidence in the government and
offering possible explanations for the trend).

